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According to the crowd within effect, the average of two estimates from one person
tends to be more accurate than a single estimate of that person. The effect implies
that the well documented wisdom of the crowd effect—the crowd’s average estimate
tends to be more accurate than the individual estimates—can be obtained within a single
individual. In this paper, we performed a high-powered, pre-registered replication study
of the original experiment. Our replication results are evaluated with the traditional null
hypothesis significance testing approach, as well as with effect sizes and their confidence
intervals. We adopted a co-pilot approach, in the sense that all analyses were performed
independently by two researchers using different analysis software. Moreover, we report
Bayes factors for all tests. We successfully replicated the crowd within effect, both when
the second guess was made immediately after the first guess, as well as when it was
made 3 weeks later. The experimental protocol, the raw data, the post-processed data
and the analysis code are available online.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Quantitative judgements to general knowledge questions are
famously known to be more accurate when estimates are averaged
over a crowd compared to the individual estimates (Surowiecki,
2004). When individuals are guessing independently of each
other, the crowd’s estimate will be closer to the truth than the
majority of the individual guesses. This “wisdom of the crowds”
effect has been observed in a wide range of applications, includ-
ing weight guessing, ordering tasks and market predictions (e.g.,
Galton, 1907; Steyvers et al., 2009; Dani et al., 2012).
In an elegant experiment, Vul and Pashler (2008) showed that
the wisdom of crowds can also be obtained within a single indi-
vidual. Participants were asked to make their best guess on eight
general knowledge questions. Immediately after completing this,
participants were unexpectedly asked to make a second, different
guess for each question. The results showed that, overall, the aver-
age of two estimates from one person was more accurate than a
single estimate of that person. It thus seems as if people possess a
crowd within they can consult.
Vul and Pashler (2008) further showed that increasing the
independence between both guesses strengthens the crowd within
effect. In particular, a second group of participants was asked to
answer the same questions 3 weeks later instead of immediately
after completing the first questionnaire. The benefit of averaging
two guesses within a person was larger in this delayed condition
than when the second guess was elicited immediately (i.e., the
immediate condition).
On a practical level, the phenomenon that averaging multiple
guesses within a person improves estimation accuracy has useful
implications in daily life with respect to decision making, as it
shows that judgements can benefit from the proverbial “sleeping
on it.” The crowd within effect has also important theoretical
implications, as it suggests that our knowledge is represented in
internal probability distributions from which responses are sam-
pled. As such, it provides a solid ground of evidence for the
emerging idea that human reasoning rests on Bayesian inference
(e.g., Tenenbaum et al., 2006; Jones and Love, 2011). The practical
and theoretical appeal of the crowd within has resulted in exten-
sive media coverage (e.g., Herbert, 2008; “The Crowd Within,”
2008) and 78 citations (according to Google Scholar, June 7,
2013).
We know of four studies that attempted to replicate the crowd
within effect in the immediate condition, with mixed results. Two
of these studies report the finding that averaging two successive
guesses from one person provides better estimates than the sin-
gle guesses (Hourihan and Benjamin, 2010; Rauhut and Lorenz,
2011)1. The results from the two remaining studies were some-
what mixed. In line with the crowd within effect, Herzog and
Hertwig (2009) showed that aggregating two guesses improved
estimation accuracy compared to single guesses. However, the
95% confidence interval for this accuracy gain included the null
value2. Finally, Edward Vul informed us about an unpublished
replication attempt that failed to find a significant improvement
1In Hourihan and Benjamin (2010), a minority of the subjects made the sec-
ond guess after a delay of less than an hour instead of immediately following
the first guess. However, Hourihan and Benjamin (2010) reported that this
procedural difference did not affect the data, so it was not examined further.
2More specifically, the reported accuracy gain (defined as the median decrease
in error of the average of the two estimates relative to the first estimate, across
items) was on average 0.3% points with SD = 2.3%, Mdn = 0%, CI = [0.0 −
0.8 %] and d = 0.12.
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of the average of two guesses compared to the first guess (Banker
andMcCoy, unpublished data). However, in support of the crowd
within, the results did point in the expected direction (see Table 1
for more details).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no replication attempts
of the delayed condition. This condition yielded the strongest
effect of the crowd within, which is in line with the idea that
the benefit of averaging is a result of the different guesses being
sampled from a probability distribution. Since a certain level of
independence between the errors of the estimates is crucial in
order to get this effect, it is logical that a three-week delay between
the guesses (inducing a greater independence) enhances the ben-
efit. Although this manipulation has never been adopted in other
research studying the crowd within, a few studies did show that
other factors boosting independence between the two guesses
enhance the benefit of averaging (e.g., Herzog and Hertwig, 2009;
Hourihan and Benjamin, 2010).
In the light of the practical and theoretical appeal of the crowd
within, and the limited success in replicating the effect, we believe
it is worthwhile to set up another attempt at replicating the crowd
within effect in both the immediate and the delayed condition of
Vul and Pashler (2008).
2. METHOD
Before the start of the data collection, we registered this study at
the Open Science Framework (osf.io/p2qfv; Spies et al., 2012).
2.1. SAMPLING PLAN
2.1.1. Immediate condition
The sampling plan for the immediate condition was based on a
power analysis considering the existing evidence for the crowd
within effect in this condition from the original paper by Vul
and Pashler (2008) on the one hand, and from two replica-
tion attempts on the other hand, namely the study by Hourihan
and Benjamin (2010) and the study by Banker and McCoy
(unpublished data). The results from Herzog and Hertwig (2009)
were not included in the power analysis, because these authors
measured accuracy gain in a different way than Vul and Pashler
(2008)3, making the reported statistics in these two studies incom-
parable. Finally, the results from Rauhut and Lorenz (2011) could
not be considered, since this study did not report sufficient
information to calculate the required effect sizes.
The power calculations were based on a weighted average effect
size across the three relevant studies. As a measure of effect size,
we used Cohen’s standardized mean difference dz for dependent
groups (Cohen, 1988, p. 48):
dz = μX − μY
σX−Y
= μX − μY√
σ 2X + σ 2Y − 2σXσYρXY
, (1)
where μX and μY are the means in the two groups, σX and σY are
the standard deviations in the two groups and ρXY is the correla-
tion between the pairs of observations. This effect size can easily
be estimated from the t-statistic for dependent groups for a given
effect and the corresponding sample size n, as follows:
dˆz = t√
n
. (2)
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, correlations
between the pairs of observations, sample sizes, t-statistics and
p-values of the immediate condition in all three studies, as well
as the resulting effect sizes. Since the crowd within effect com-
prises an accuracy gain of the average guess compared to either of
both single guesses, two effect sizes were calculated in each study:
One effect size for guess 1 (i.e., the standardized mean difference
between the mean squared error (MSE) of guess 1 and theMSE of
3Whereas Vul and Pashler (2008) measured accuracy gain by taking the differ-
ence between the mean squared error (MSE) of one of the single estimates and
the MSE of the aggregated guess, Herzog and Hertwig (2009) defined accu-
racy gain as the median decrease in absolute error of the aggregated estimates
relative to the first estimate.
Table 1 | Statistics for guess 1 and guess 2 in the immediate condition for the three studies included in the power analysis.
Study Mean MSE Mean MSE SD MSE SD MSE r n t p dˆz
single guess average guess single guess average guess
GUESS 1
Vul and Pashler, 2008 555* 508* 361* 305* 0.88* 255 4.41* < 0.001* 0.28
Hourihan and Benjamin, 2010 502 484 261◦ 268◦ 0.91◦ 170 2.15 0.03 0.16
Banker and McCoy, unpublished data 463* 452* 281* 268* 0.95* 201 1.71* 0.09* 0.12
GUESS 2
Vul and Pashler, 2008 638* 508* 382* 305* 0.83* 255 9.90* < 0.001* 0.62
Hourihan and Benjamin, 2010 565 484 274◦ 268◦ 0.87◦ 170 7.89 < 0.001 0.61
Banker and McCoy, unpublished data 509* 452* 298* 268* 0.92* 201 7.03* < 0.001* 0.50
The reported t-values of Vul and Pashler (2008) differ from what is reported in the original paper. Contacting the authors concerning the experiment led them to
uncover that the data show a stronger evidence for the crowd within effect than what had been reported in the article originally. The t-statistic values for the crowd
within effect on both the first and the second guess were reported smaller than they actually are. The reported t-values here are the correct ones.
MSE = mean squared error; SD = standard deviation; r = correlation between single guess and average guess; n = sample size; t = dependent t-statistic value;
p = p-value of corresponding statistic; dˆz = effect size.
*Computed from raw data, numerically reported in paper, ◦derived from numerically reported statistics in paper.
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the aggregated guess) and another effect size for guess 2 (i.e., the
standardized mean difference between theMSE of guess 2 and the
MSE of the aggregated guess).
We pooled the individual effect sizes across the studies by
weighing each effect size with its inverse variance (Cooper et al.,
2009):
dz =
∑k
i= 1 widˆzi∑k
i= 1 wi
, (3)
where k is the number of studies and wi is the inverse of the
variance vi of effect size dˆzi in study i:
1
wi
= vi =
(
1
ni
+ dˆzi
2
2ni
)
2(1 − ri), (4)
where ni is the sample size and ri is the correlation between the
pairs of observations in study i.
Pooling the effect sizes across the three studies resulted in a
weighted average effect size of dz = 0.17 for guess 1 and dz = 0.56
for guess 2.
Using G∗Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009), we calculated a planned
sample size for achieving a 0.95 power level using a two-tailed
dependent t-test, given both effect sizes. This resulted in a sample
size n = 439 for guess 1 and n = 31 for guess 2. To be most con-
servative, we planned to adopt at least the largest sample size of
these two, that is n = 439.
2.1.2. Delayed condition
As there are no known replication attempts of the crowd within
effect in the delayed condition, the sampling plan for this condi-
tion was based on an effect size estimated from Vul and Pashler
(2008) only. Again, we used Cohen’s dz as a measure of effect size,
and we estimated an effect size for guess 1 and guess 2, using for-
mula (2). The estimated effect sizes, as well as the means, standard
deviations, correlations, sample sizes, t-statistics and p-values are
shown in Table 2. Using G∗Power 3.1, we calculated a planned
sample size n = 48 for guess 1 and n = 13 for guess 2 in order to
achieve a power of 0.95, using a two-tailed dependent t-test. To be
conservative, we planned to adopt a sample size of at least n = 48
in the delayed condition.
2.1.3. Recruitment
We recruited participants at the University of Leuven. Psychology
students were asked to participate in the experiment either in
turn for course credits (immediate condition) or for a chance
to win cinema tickets (delayed condition). Given the character-
istics of psychology students, we expected a majority of female
participants between the age of 18 and 23. Following the original
paper, participants did not have to meet any inclusion criteria.
As will become clear below, we did not know beforehand the
exact number of participants, so the sample sizes computed above
are minimal sample sizes. Data were only analyzed once to avoid
multiple comparison issues.
For the immediate condition, we recruited participants until
we had reached at least the planned sample size of 439. In par-
ticular, we made use of sessions where participants were assigned
in batches. The size of each batch was largely beyond our control,
making the exact sample size unknown beforehand. We used the
minimum number of batches to reach the planned minimal sam-
ple size of 439. The actual sample size was expected to be larger
than 439.
For the delayed condition, we made use of a pool of about 300
students attending a course. All of them were invited to partic-
ipate in an experiment consisting of two sessions. Three weeks
after the first session, students who participated in the first ses-
sion were invited to participate in the second session. Data were
used from students who participated in both sessions (i.e., data
from students who only participated in the first session were dis-
carded). Again, the actual sample size was unknown beforehand,
and was expected to be larger than 484.
2.2. MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
2.2.1. Materials
The original material in the study of Vul and Pashler consisted
of eight real-world knowledge questions5, shown in Table 3. We
adopted these questions with updated answers (derived from The
World Factbook; Central Intelligence Agency, 2013), as shown in
Table 3. These questions were translated in Dutch.
4We planned that in the unlikely case that the planned sample size was not
reached (i.e., there were less than 48 students participating twice), we would
repeat the procedure in another course and combine the data from both
courses in our analyses. However, this turned out to be unnecessary.
5We retrieved these questions from Edward Vul’s webpage (Vul, n.d.).
Table 2 | Statistics for guess 1 and guess 2 in the delayed condition for the study included in the power analysis.
Study Mean MSE Mean MSE SD MSE SD MSE r n t p dˆz
single guess average guess single guess average guess
GUESS 1
Vul and Pashler, 2008 542* 447* 363* 273* 0.84* 173 6.22* < 0.001* 0.47
GUESS 2
Vul and Pashler, 2008 610* 447* 380* 273* 0.83* 173 9.85* < 0.001* 0.75
The reported t-values of Vul and Pashler (2008) differ from what is reported in the original paper. See Table 1 for further information.
MSE = mean squared error; SD = standard deviation; r = correlation between single guess and average guess; n = sample size; t = dependent t-statistic value;
p = p-value of corresponding statistic; dˆz = effect size.
*Computed from raw data, numerically reported in paper, ◦derived from numerically reported statistics in paper.
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Table 3 | Questions used in Vul and Pashler (2008) with original answers and updated answers.
No. Question Answers in Answers in
Vul and Pashler (2008) current study
1 The area of the USA is what percent of the area of the Pacific Ocean? 6.3 6.3
2 What percent of the world’s population lives in either China, India, or the European Union? 44.4 43.3
3 What percent of the world’s airports are in the United States? 30.3 32.3
4 What percent of the world’s roads are in India? 10.5 13.4
5 What percent of the world’s countries have a higher fertility rate than the United states? 58 53.6
6 What percent of the world’s telephone lines are in China, USA, or the European Union? 72.4 54.8
7 Saudi Arabia consumes what percentage of the oil it produces? 18.9 26.4
8 What percentage of the world’s countries have a higher life expectancy than the United States? 20.3 22.4
2.2.2. Procedure immediate condition
Participants were seated in front of computer screens in groups
of 10–15 persons. At the beginning of the study, they were asked
to activate full screen mode on their computer and to stay in
this mode during the entire experiment. This was to prevent
them from looking up the answers to the questions. Next, after
signing an informed consent and providing their demographic
details (sex, age, and nationality), participants were given the
eight general knowledge questions sequentially, with the instruc-
tion to guess the correct answers and to not look them up. In line
with the original study (Edward Vul, personal communication,
June 6, 2013), the eight questions were presented in randomized
order and participants were prevented from going back to earlier
questions. Immediately after completing the first questionnaire,
participants were unexpectedly asked to make a second, different
guess for each question. Again, the questions were presented in
randomized order. After completion, participants were asked to
indicate whether they had looked up the answers to the questions
or not.
2.2.3. Procedure delayed condition
Students attending a course were asked to participate in a short
experiment later that day, on the internet, without explaining
the task they would have to perform. At the time of the exper-
iment, participants were asked to activate full screen mode on
their computer and to stay in this mode during the entire exper-
iment. They were also asked not to seek help from anyone while
performing the task. In line with the original study (Edward Vul,
personal communication, October 19, 2013), participants were
informed that there would be a second session of the experiment 3
weeks later, but without giving advance notice that they would be
answering the questions a second time. After signing an informed
consent and providing their demographic details (sex, age, and
nationality), participants were given the eight general knowledge
questions in the same way as in the immediate condition. After
completing the questionnaire, participants were asked not to dis-
cuss the task with their companion students or other people, nor
to look up the answers to the questions. Three weeks later, par-
ticipants who participated in the first session of the experiment
were invited per mail to participate in the second session, also
on the internet. In this session, they were asked to give a second,
different guess to each of the eight questions. At the end of the sec-
ond session, participants were asked to indicate whether they had
looked up the answers to the questions (either during the first ses-
sion, during the second session or in the period between the two
sessions) or not.
2.3. KNOWN DIFFERENCES FROM ORIGINAL STUDY
The study differed from the original study in two aspects. Firstly,
as we explained above, the real-world knowledge questions used
in the study of Vul and Pashler (2008) were translated to Dutch
and the answers to these questions were updated.
Secondly, we expected that our subject pool of undergradu-
ate students would be less diverse than the internet-based subject
pool in the original study with respect to variables such as age,
ethnicity and educational level. However, we do not believe this is
critical for a fair replication, since there is no a priori or theoret-
ical reason why the crowd within effect would rely on these type
of variables.
2.4. CONFIRMATORY ANALYSIS PLAN
2.4.1. Data cleaning plan
Vul and Pashler (2008) did not adopt any data filtering proce-
dures in their study (Edward Vul, personal communication, April
30, 2013). However, following the original authors’ advice, we
planned to exclude data from those participants which defocused
the browser window running the study, as the latter may be an
indication of participants looking up the answers to the questions.
On the same line of reasoning, we planned to exclude data from
participants who indicated that they had looked up the answers to
the questions at the end of the experiment. Further, we planned
to exclude data when impossible answers (i.e., percentages below
zero or above hundred) or blank answers were given. In this case,
both guesses for the concerning question were planned to be
excluded from the analyses.
2.4.2. Analysis process
A complete replication of the Vul and Pashler (2008) paper
includes a higher accuracy of the aggregated guess compared to
the individual guesses, in both the immediate and the delayed
condition.
In accordance with the original study, we assessed for each
participant the accuracy of a guess with the MSE of the esti-
mate across all eight questions. In each condition, the MSE of
guess 1, guess 2, and the average of both guesses was calculated
for each participant. The MSE of the average was calculated by
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 786 | 4
Steegen et al. Crowd within
first averaging guess 1 and guess 2, and then computing the MSE.
Next, we compared the MSE of guess 1 and the MSE of the aver-
age of both guesses across participants by performing a two tailed
t-test for paired observations. Further, we repeated this for the
comparison of the MSE of guess 2 and the MSE of the average of
both guesses. For each condition, if the observed values of both
t-statistics were positive (i.e., both the MSE of guess 1 and the
MSE of guess 2 were on average larger than the MSE of the aggre-
gated guess) and a p-value smaller than 0.05 was obtained for both
the tests, we evaluated the replication of the crowd within effect
as being successful in the concerning condition.
Besides these traditional metrics for evaluating the success of a
replication attempt, we calculated the effect sizes, dˆz, for guess 1
(i.e., the standardized mean difference between the MSE of guess
1 and the MSE of the aggregated guess) and for guess 2 (i.e., the
standardized mean difference between theMSE of guess 2 and the
MSE of the aggregated guess), together with their 95% confidence
intervals. This allowed us to consider subtleties in the replication
outcomes beyond the traditional dichotomy of failure or success
of the replication attempt (see Simonsohn, 2013).
Following Vul and Pashler (2008), we performed two addi-
tional tests. First, we also compared the difference in accuracy
between guess 1 and guess 2, again by performing a two tailed
t-test for paired observations. Vul and Pashler (2008) found that
second guesses were less accurate than first guesses, indicating
that the accuracy gain of averaging could not be attributed to
subjects looking up the answers between guesses. Second, we
compared the benefit of averaging in the immediate condition
and the delayed condition by performing an unpaired t-test on
the mean difference in error between the first guess and the aver-
age guess in the immediate condition vs. the delayed condition.
As discussed in the Introduction, Vul and Pashler (2008) found
that the benefit of averaging was greater in the delayed condition
than in the immediate condition.
An executable Matlab script of the analyses can be found in
Appendix A in the Supplementary Material.
3. RESULTS
The raw data and post-processed data are available at the Open
Science Framework (osf.io/ivfu6; Spies et al., 2012), accompanied
with threeMatlab scripts to execute the post-processing of the raw
data, the pre-registered confirmatory analyses (see also Appendix
B in the Supplementary Material)6 and additional post-hoc analy-
ses. We adopted a co-pilot approach (Wicherts, 2011) in the sense
that aside from the analyses based on this Matlab code, the sec-
ond author independently post-processed and analyzed the data
in SPSS, except for the calculation of the confidence intervals for
the effect sizes and the calculation of the Bayes factors. The results
obtained from these SPSS analyses were identical to the results
from the Matlab analyses.
6Whereas Appendix A in the Supplementary Material contains the pre-
registered Matlab code for the confirmatory analyses, we used the code
in Appendix B in the Supplementary Material. The code in Appendix B
in the Supplementary Material extends the code in Appendix A in the
Supplementary Material in that it contains code for the calculation of descrip-
tive statistics, some effect sizes, some confidence intervals for effect sizes, and
code to make the scatter histogram plots in Figure 2.
3.1. SAMPLE
3.1.1. Immediate condition
A total of 484 psychology students participated in the immediate
condition. However, 11 of these participants did not complete the
experiment, so the data from these participants were excluded in
the data analysis. Following our pre-registered data cleaning plan,
we also excluded the data from two participants who indicated
that they had looked up the answers to the questions. Further, we
were planning to exclude data from those participants who defo-
cused the browser window while running the study. Yet, due to a
technical problem, the digital assessment of whether participants
had defocused the browser window in the immediate condition
was not reliable. Fortunately, this is not problematic in this con-
dition, as at the time of the data collection an experimenter was
present in the back of the room, ascertaining that participants
did not defocus the browser window. Finally, we were planning
to exclude data when impossible answers (i.e., percentages below
zero or above hundred) or blank answers were given. However,
as it was made impossible to provide these type of answers in the
experiment, this part of the data cleaning plan did not need to be
executed. Our final sample of 471 psychology students consisted
of 397 women and 74 men, with a mean age of 19.2 (SD = 2.8).
Note that the gender imbalance in our sample is according to our
expectations.
3.1.2. Delayed condition
A total of 231 psychology students participated in the first ses-
sion of the delayed condition and 171 of these students also
participated in the second session. We excluded the data from 9
participants who did not complete one or both sessions, the data
from 21 participants who defocused the browser window while
running the study and the data from one participant who indi-
cated that she had looked up the answers to the questions. Similar
to the immediate condition, it was made impossible for partici-
pants to provide impossible or blank answers, so we did not need
to exclude data based on these criteria. Our final sample of 140
participants consisted of 125 women and 15 men, with a mean
age of 22.0 (SD = 3.1). Again, this gender imbalance is according
to our expectations.
3.2. CONFIRMATORY ANALYSIS
As shown in Figure 1, both in the immediate and in the delayed
condition, the accuracy of the aggregated guess was higher com-
pared to the accuracy of the individual guesses (see also Table 4).
In the immediate condition, the mean MSE of the average of
the two guesses (M = 541, SD = 313) was smaller than both
the mean MSE of guess 1 (M = 589, SD = 336), t(470) = 8.69,
p < 0.001, dˆz = 0.40, 95% CI = [0.31, 0.49] and the mean MSE
of guess 2 (M = 615, SD = 351), t(470) = 10.26, p < 0.001,
dˆz = 0.47, 95% CI = [0.38, 0.57]. Likewise, in the delayed con-
dition, the mean MSE of the average of the two guesses (M =
467, SD = 260) was smaller than both the mean MSE of guess
1 (M = 517, SD = 288), t(139) = 4.02, p < 0.001, dˆz = 0.34,
95% CI = [0.17, 0.51] and the mean MSE of guess 2 (M =
589, SD = 327), t(139) = 8.48, p < 0.001, dˆz = 0.72, 95% CI
= [0.53, 0.90]. Thus, our results are comparable to the results
obtained by Vul and Pashler (2008).
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According to the traditional standards for evaluating replica-
tion attempts, the current study can be considered as a successful
replication of the crowd within effect, in both the immediate and
the delayed condition. Another strategy for evaluating replication
attempts has recently been proposed by Simonsohn (2013), who
suggests to compare confidence intervals for effect sizes with the
small effect size d33%, associated with a power of 33% in the orig-
inal study. According to this detectability approach, a replication
attempt is successful when the null hypothesis is rejected and the
effect size estimate is not significantly smaller than d33%. Using
G∗Power 3.1, we calculated that d33% = 0.10 in the immediate
condition and d33% = 0.12 in the delayed condition, based on the
sample sizes from Vul and Pashler (2008). Clearly, our effect size
estimates of both guesses in both conditions are larger than d33%,
so against this criterion also, the current study is a successful repli-
cation of the crowd within effect in both the immediate and the
delayed condition.
Following Vul and Pashler (2008), we performed two addi-
tional analyses. First, both in the immediate and in the delayed
condition, second guesses were less accurate than first guesses. In
the immediate condition, the mean MSE of guess 1 (M = 589,
FIGURE 1 | Mean mean squared errors (MSE’s) of guess 1, guess 2 and
the average of both guesses in the immediate condition and the
delayed condition. Error bars represent standard errors.
SD = 336) was smaller than the mean MSE of guess 2 (M =
615, SD = 351), t(470) = −2.25, p = 0.025, dˆz = −0.10, 95%CI
= [−0.19,−0.01]. Likewise, in the delayed condition, the mean
MSE of guess 1 (M = 517, SD = 288) was smaller than the mean
MSE of guess 2 (M = 589, SD = 327), t(139) = −2.91, p =
0.004, dˆz = −0.25, 95% CI= [−0.41,−0.08]. These results reas-
sure that the accuracy gain of averaging could not be attributed to
participants looking up the answers between guesses. This is also
confirmed by the scatter plots with themarginal histograms of the
MSE’s of guess 1 and guess 2 in both conditions (see Figure 2). As
noted by Vul (n.d.), if participants were looking up the answers,
there should be a peak in the error histograms at the value that can
be expected when people know the right answer, i.e., error = 0.
Clearly, this is not the case in Figure 2.
Second, unlike in Vul and Pashler (2008), the accuracy gain
of averaging both guesses compared to guess 1 was not signif-
icantly larger in the delayed condition than in the immediate
condition7. The mean difference between the MSE of the average
and the MSE of guess 1 was not significantly larger in the delayed
condition (M = 50, SD = 147) than in the immediate condition
(M = 48, SD = 119), t(609) = 0.18, p = 0.858, dˆ = 0.02, 95%
CI = [−0.17, 0.21].
3.3. POST-HOC ANALYSES
Since we were surprised by the non-significant difference between
the immediate and the delayed condition in the accuracy gain of
averaging guesses compared to guess 1, we also tested the differ-
ence between both conditions by comparing the average guess to
guess 2. Unlike our comparison with guess 1, the mean difference
between theMSE of the average and theMSE of guess 2 was signif-
icantly larger in the delayed condition (M = 121, SD = 169) than
in the immediate condition (M = 73, SD = 155), t(609) = 3.14,
p = 0.002, dˆ = 0.30, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.49]. As this comparison
was not reported in the original paper, we performed the same
analysis on the raw data of the original study, which were pro-
vided to us by Edward Vul. Unlike in the current study, the mean
7Contacting the authors concerning the experiment led them to uncover
that their data show a slightly stronger evidence for this accuracy gain effect
between both conditions than what had been reported in the article origi-
nally. The reported t-statistic, [t(426) = 2.12, p < 0.05], was smaller than the
correct t-value, [t(426) = 2.68, p = 0.008].
Table 4 | Statistics for guess 1 and guess 2 in the immediate condition and the delayed condition in the current study.
Condition Mean MSE Mean MSE SD MSE SD MSE r n t p dˆz
single guess average guess single guess average guess
GUESS 1
Immediate condition 589 541 336 313 0.93 471 8.69 <0.001 0.40
Delayed condition 517 467 288 260 0.86 140 4.02 <0.001 0.34
GUESS 2
Immediate condition 615 541 351 313 0.90 471 10.26 <0.001 0.47
Delayed condition 589 467 327 260 0.86 140 8.48 <0.001 0.72
MSE = mean squared error; SD = standard deviation; r = correlation between single guess and average guess; n = sample size; t = dependent t-statistic value;
p = p-value of corresponding statistic; dˆz = effect size.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean squared errors (MSE’s) of guess 1 and guess 2 in the immediate (A) and in the delayed (B) condition.
difference between the MSE of the average and the MSE of guess
2 was not significantly larger in the delayed condition (M = 164,
SD = 218) than in the immediate condition (M = 131, SD =
211), t(426) = 1.56, p = 0.12, dˆ = 0.15.
In sum, the evidence for the difference in magnitude of the
crowd within effect between the immediate condition and the
delayed condition is mixed.Whereas the original study by Vul and
Pashler (2008) yields a significant difference between both con-
ditions when the average guess is compared to guess 1, but not
when it is compared to guess 2, the present study yields the oppo-
site pattern: When the average guess is compared to guess 2, there
is a significant difference between both conditions, but when it
is compared to guess 1, the difference is not significant. Thus, in
both studies, introducing a three-week delay increased the benefit
of averaging compared to one of both guesses only. However, it is
important to keep in mind the exploratory nature of these anal-
yses, as we did not use a power analysis to determine the sample
size for testing these effects and we did not a priori specify the
comparison of the average with guess 2.
3.4. BAYES FACTORS FOR CONFIRMATORY AND POST-HOC ANALYSES
The Bayesian alternative to null hypothesis significance testing is
calculating the Bayes factor (BF), which quantifies the evidence of
the null hypothesis relative to the alternative hypothesis. In con-
trast to a p-value, the BF can provide evidence both in favor or
against the null hypothesis. Therefore, in addition to p-values,
we calculated BF’s for all tests, using a web-based Bayes factor
calculator8. Table 5 shows the BF’s for all tests of the confirma-
tory and post-hoc analyses, together with the t-statistics, sample
sizes and p-values. All BF’s show qualitatively identical results
as the null hypothesis significance tests (i.e., tests with p < 0.05
have BF < 1, indicating evidence for the alternative hypothesis,
whereas tests with p > 0.05 have BF > 1, indicating evidence for
the null hypothesis), except for the comparison between the error
of guess 1 and guess 2 in the immediate condition. The p-value
for this latter test is 0.025, suggesting the difference is significant,
8The Bayes factor calculator, available at http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor,
requires input of the t-statistic and the sample size only. Following Rouder
et al. (2009)’s recommendations, we report the JZS Bayes factor.
Table 5 | JZS Bayes factors (BF, with scale r = 1) in favor of the null
hypothesis of no difference for all tests.
t n p BF
8.69 471 <0.001 1.8 10−14
10.26 471 <0.001 7.1 10−20
4.02 140 <0.001 0.007
8.48 140 <0.001 4.7 10−12
−2.25 471 0.025 2.208
−2.91 140 0.004 0.252
0.18 471 (n1) & 140 (n2) 0.858 12.931
3.14 471 (n1) & 140 (n2) 0.002 0.107
The first seven tests are from the confirmatory analyses, the last test is from
the post-hoc analyses.
whereas the BF is 2.208, indicating anecdotal evidence for the
null hypothesis of no difference. However, both results are consis-
tent with participants not having looked up the answers between
guesses.
4. DISCUSSION
Our replication attempt of the crowd within effect supports the
original finding by Vul and Pashler (2008) that averaging two
guesses within one person provides a more accurate answer than
either guess alone. This effect was found when the second guess
was made immediately after the first guess (immediate condi-
tion), as well as when the second guess was made 3 weeks later
(delayed condition). These results were evaluated as successful
replications against two different replication evaluation stan-
dards: The traditional p-value approach on the one hand, and the
recently proposed detectability approach on the other hand.
The three-week delay between the two guesses improved the
accuracy gain of averaging compared to guess 2, but not com-
pared to guess 1. These results are comparable to those in Vul
and Pashler (2008), where an increase in accuracy gain was also
observed with the comparison of one of both guesses only. Thus,
it seems that more research is needed to investigate whether a
temporal separation between guesses can boost the crowd within
effect.
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